Annotation Property: 'editor note'
Usage (63)
- 'located in' Domain 'independent continuant'
- 'editor note' "This is redundant with the more specific 'independent and not spatial region' constraint. We leave in the redundant axiom for use with reasoners that do not use negation."
- 'located in' Range 'independent continuant'
- 'editor note' "This is redundant with the more specific 'independent and not spatial region' constraint. We leave in the redundant axiom for use with reasoners that do not use negation."
- entity 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: In all areas of empirical inquiry we encounter general terms of two sorts. First are general terms which refer to universals or types:animaltuberculosissurgical procedurediseaseSecond, are general terms used to refer to groups of entities which instantiate a given universal but do not correspond to the extension of any subuniversal of that universal because there is nothing intrinsic to the entities in question by virtue of which they – and only they – are counted as belonging to the given group. Examples are: animal purchased by the Emperortuberculosis diagnosed on a Wednesdaysurgical procedure performed on a patient from Stockholmperson identified as candidate for clinical trial #2056-555person who is signatory of Form 656-PPVpainting by Leonardo da VinciSuch terms, which represent what are called ‘specializations’ in [81" @en
- entity 'editor note' "Entity doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't necessarily exhaust all possibilites. For example Werner Ceusters 'portions of reality' include 4 sorts, entities (as BFO construes them), universals, configurations, and relations. It is an open question as to whether entities as construed in BFO will at some point also include these other portions of reality. See, for example, 'How to track absolutely everything' at http://www.referent-tracking.com/_RTU/papers/CeustersICbookRevised.pdf" @en
- continuant 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Continuant entities are entities which can be sliced to yield parts only along the spatial dimension, yielding for example the parts of your table which we call its legs, its top, its nails. ‘My desk stretches from the window to the door. It has spatial parts, and can be sliced (in space) in two. With respect to time, however, a thing is a continuant.’ [60, p. 240" @en
- continuant 'editor note' "Continuant doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't necessarily exhaust all possibilites. For example, in an expansion involving bringing in some of Ceuster's other portions of reality, questions are raised as to whether universals are continuants" @en
- occurrent 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: every occurrent that is not a temporal or spatiotemporal region is s-dependent on some independent continuant that is not a spatial region" @en
- occurrent 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: s-dependence obtains between every process and its participants in the sense that, as a matter of necessity, this process could not have existed unless these or those participants existed also. A process may have a succession of participants at different phases of its unfolding. Thus there may be different players on the field at different times during the course of a football game; but the process which is the entire game s-depends_on all of these players nonetheless. Some temporal parts of this process will s-depend_on on only some of the players." @en
- occurrent 'editor note' "Occurrent doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't necessarily exhaust all possibilites. An example would be the sum of a process and the process boundary of another process." @en
- occurrent 'editor note' "Simons uses different terminology for relations of occurrents to regions: Denote the spatio-temporal location of a given occurrent e by 'spn[e]' and call this region its span. We may say an occurrent is at its span, in any larger region, and covers any smaller region. Now suppose we have fixed a frame of reference so that we can speak not merely of spatio-temporal but also of spatial regions (places) and temporal regions (times). The spread of an occurrent, (relative to a frame of reference) is the space it exactly occupies, and its spell is likewise the time it exactly occupies. We write 'spr[e]' and `spl[e]' respectively for the spread and spell of e, omitting mention of the frame."
- 'spatial region' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Spatial regions do not participate in processes." @en
- 'spatial region' 'editor note' "Spatial region doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't exhaust all possibilites. An example would be the union of a spatial point and a spatial line that doesn't overlap the point, or two spatial lines that intersect at a single point. In both cases the resultant spatial region is neither 0-dimensional, 1-dimensional, 2-dimensional, or 3-dimensional." @en
- 'temporal region' 'editor note' "Temporal region doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't exhaust all possibilites. An example would be the mereological sum of a temporal instant and a temporal interval that doesn't overlap the instant. In this case the resultant temporal region is neither 0-dimensional nor 1-dimensional" @en
- process 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: The realm of occurrents is less pervasively marked by the presence of natural units than is the case in the realm of independent continuants. Thus there is here no counterpart of ‘object’. In BFO 1.0 ‘process’ served as such a counterpart. In BFO 2.0 ‘process’ is, rather, the occurrent counterpart of ‘material entity’. Those natural – as contrasted with engineered, which here means: deliberately executed – units which do exist in the realm of occurrents are typically either parasitic on the existence of natural units on the continuant side, or they are fiat in nature. Thus we can count lives; we can count football games; we can count chemical reactions performed in experiments or in chemical manufacturing. We cannot count the processes taking place, for instance, in an episode of insect mating behavior.Even where natural units are identifiable, for example cycles in a cyclical process such as the beating of a heart or an organism’s sleep/wake cycle, the processes in question form a sequence with no discontinuities (temporal gaps) of the sort that we find for instance where billiard balls or zebrafish or planets are separated by clear spatial gaps. Lives of organisms are process units, but they too unfold in a continuous series from other, prior processes such as fertilization, and they unfold in turn in continuous series of post-life processes such as post-mortem decay. Clear examples of boundaries of processes are almost always of the fiat sort (midnight, a time of death as declared in an operating theater or on a death certificate, the initiation of a state of war)" @en
- disposition 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Dispositions exist along a strength continuum. Weaker forms of disposition are realized in only a fraction of triggering cases. These forms occur in a significant number of cases of a similar type." @en
- 'specifically dependent continuant' 'editor note' "Specifically dependent continuant doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't necessarily exhaust all possibilites. We're not sure what else will develop here, but for example there are questions such as what are promises, obligation, etc." @en
- role 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: One major family of examples of non-rigid universals involves roles, and ontologies developed for corresponding administrative purposes may consist entirely of representatives of entities of this sort. Thus ‘professor’, defined as follows,b instance_of professor at t =Def. there is some c, c instance_of professor role & c inheres_in b at t.denotes a non-rigid universal and so also do ‘nurse’, ‘student’, ‘colonel’, ‘taxpayer’, and so forth. (These terms are all, in the jargon of philosophy, phase sortals.) By using role terms in definitions, we can create a BFO conformant treatment of such entities drawing on the fact that, while an instance of professor may be simultaneously an instance of trade union member, no instance of the type professor role is also (at any time) an instance of the type trade union member role (any more than any instance of the type color is at any time an instance of the type length).If an ontology of employment positions should be defined in terms of roles following the above pattern, this enables the ontology to do justice to the fact that individuals instantiate the corresponding universals – professor, sergeant, nurse – only during certain phases in their lives." @en
- 'fiat object part' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Most examples of fiat object parts are associated with theoretically drawn divisions" @en
- 'object aggregate' 'editor note' "An entity a is an object aggregate if and only if there is a mutually exhaustive and pairwise disjoint partition of a into objects "
- 'object aggregate' 'editor note' "An entity a is an object aggregate if and only if there is a mutually exhaustive and pairwise disjoint partition of a into objects "
- 'object aggregate' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: object aggregates may gain and lose parts while remaining numerically identical (one and the same individual) over time. This holds both for aggregates whose membership is determined naturally (the aggregate of cells in your body) and aggregates determined by fiat (a baseball team, a congressional committee)." @en
- object 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: BFO rests on the presupposition that at multiple micro-, meso- and macroscopic scales reality exhibits certain stable, spatially separated or separable material units, combined or combinable into aggregates of various sorts (for example organisms into what are called ‘populations’). Such units play a central role in almost all domains of natural science from particle physics to cosmology. Many scientific laws govern the units in question, employing general terms (such as ‘molecule’ or ‘planet’) referring to the types and subtypes of units, and also to the types and subtypes of the processes through which such units develop and interact. The division of reality into such natural units is at the heart of biological science, as also is the fact that these units may form higher-level units (as cells form multicellular organisms) and that they may also form aggregates of units, for example as cells form portions of tissue and organs form families, herds, breeds, species, and so on. At the same time, the division of certain portions of reality into engineered units (manufactured artifacts) is the basis of modern industrial technology, which rests on the distributed mass production of engineered parts through division of labor and on their assembly into larger, compound units such as cars and laptops. The division of portions of reality into units is one starting point for the phenomenon of counting." @en
- object 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Each object is such that there are entities of which we can assert unproblematically that they lie in its interior, and other entities of which we can assert unproblematically that they lie in its exterior. This may not be so for entities lying at or near the boundary between the interior and exterior. This means that two objects – for example the two cells depicted in Figure 3 – may be such that there are material entities crossing their boundaries which belong determinately to neither cell. Something similar obtains in certain cases of conjoined twins (see below)." @en
- object 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: To say that b is causally unified means: b is a material entity which is such that its material parts are tied together in such a way that, in environments typical for entities of the type in question,if c, a continuant part of b that is in the interior of b at t, is larger than a certain threshold size (which will be determined differently from case to case, depending on factors such as porosity of external cover) and is moved in space to be at t at a location on the exterior of the spatial region that had been occupied by b at t, then either b’s other parts will be moved in coordinated fashion or b will be damaged (be affected, for example, by breakage or tearing) in the interval between t and t.causal changes in one part of b can have consequences for other parts of b without the mediation of any entity that lies on the exterior of b. Material entities with no proper material parts would satisfy these conditions trivially. Candidate examples of types of causal unity for material entities of more complex sorts are as follows (this is not intended to be an exhaustive list):CU1: Causal unity via physical coveringHere the parts in the interior of the unified entity are combined together causally through a common membrane or other physical covering\. The latter points outwards toward and may serve a protective function in relation to what lies on the exterior of the entity [13, 47" @en
- object 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: an object is a maximal causally unified material entity" @en
- object 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: ‘objects’ are sometimes referred to as ‘grains’ [74" @en
- function 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: In the past, we have distinguished two varieties of function, artifactual function and biological function. These are not asserted subtypes of BFO:function however, since the same function – for example: to pump, to transport – can exist both in artifacts and in biological entities. The asserted subtypes of function that would be needed in order to yield a separate monoheirarchy are not artifactual function, biological function, etc., but rather transporting function, pumping function, etc." @en
- 'one-dimensional temporal region' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: A temporal interval is a special kind of one-dimensional temporal region, namely one that is self-connected (is without gaps or breaks)." @en
- 'material entity' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Material entities (continuants) can preserve their identity even while gaining and losing material parts. Continuants are contrasted with occurrents, which unfold themselves in successive temporal parts or phases [60" @en
- 'material entity' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Object, Fiat Object Part and Object Aggregate are not intended to be exhaustive of Material Entity. Users are invited to propose new subcategories of Material Entity." @en
- 'material entity' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: ‘Matter’ is intended to encompass both mass and energy (we will address the ontological treatment of portions of energy in a later version of BFO). A portion of matter is anything that includes elementary particles among its proper or improper parts: quarks and leptons, including electrons, as the smallest particles thus far discovered; baryons (including protons and neutrons) at a higher level of granularity; atoms and molecules at still higher levels, forming the cells, organs, organisms and other material entities studied by biologists, the portions of rock studied by geologists, the fossils studied by paleontologists, and so on.Material entities are three-dimensional entities (entities extended in three spatial dimensions), as contrasted with the processes in which they participate, which are four-dimensional entities (entities extended also along the dimension of time).According to the FMA, material entities may have immaterial entities as parts – including the entities identified below as sites; for example the interior (or ‘lumen’) of your small intestine is a part of your body. BFO 2.0 embodies a decision to follow the FMA here." @en
- 'part of' 'editor note' "Everything is part of itself. Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing. Two distinct things cannot be part of each other." @en
- 'part of' 'editor note' "Occurrents are not subject to change and so parthood between occurrents holds for all the times that the part exists. Many continuants are subject to change, so parthood between continuants will only hold at certain times, but this is difficult to specify in OWL. See https://code.google.com/p/obo-relations/wiki/ROAndTime" @en
- 'part of' 'editor note' "Parthood requires the part and the whole to have compatible classes: only an occurrent can be part of an occurrent; only a process can be part of a process; only a continuant can be part of a continuant; only an independent continuant can be part of an independent continuant; only an immaterial entity can be part of an immaterial entity; only a specifically dependent continuant can be part of a specifically dependent continuant; only a generically dependent continuant can be part of a generically dependent continuant. (This list is not exhaustive.)
A continuant cannot be part of an occurrent: use 'participates in'. An occurrent cannot be part of a continuant: use 'has participant'. A material entity cannot be part of an immaterial entity: use 'has location'. A specifically dependent continuant cannot be part of an independent continuant: use 'inheres in'. An independent continuant cannot be part of a specifically dependent continuant: use 'bearer of'." @en
- 'has part' 'editor note' "Everything has itself as a part. Any part of any part of a thing is itself part of that thing. Two distinct things cannot have each other as a part." @en
- 'has part' 'editor note' "Occurrents are not subject to change and so parthood between occurrents holds for all the times that the part exists. Many continuants are subject to change, so parthood between continuants will only hold at certain times, but this is difficult to specify in OWL. See https://code.google.com/p/obo-relations/wiki/ROAndTime" @en
- 'has part' 'editor note' "Parthood requires the part and the whole to have compatible classes: only an occurrent have an occurrent as part; only a process can have a process as part; only a continuant can have a continuant as part; only an independent continuant can have an independent continuant as part; only a specifically dependent continuant can have a specifically dependent continuant as part; only a generically dependent continuant can have a generically dependent continuant as part. (This list is not exhaustive.)
A continuant cannot have an occurrent as part: use 'participates in'. An occurrent cannot have a continuant as part: use 'has participant'. An immaterial entity cannot have a material entity as part: use 'location of'. An independent continuant cannot have a specifically dependent continuant as part: use 'bearer of'. A specifically dependent continuant cannot have an independent continuant as part: use 'inheres in'." @en
- 'continuant fiat boundary' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: In BFO 1.1 the assumption was made that the external surface of a material entity such as a cell could be treated as if it were a boundary in the mathematical sense. The new document propounds the view that when we talk about external surfaces of material objects in this way then we are talking about something fiat. To be dealt with in a future version: fiat boundaries at different levels of granularity.More generally, the focus in discussion of boundaries in BFO 2.0 is now on fiat boundaries, which means: boundaries for which there is no assumption that they coincide with physical discontinuities. The ontology of boundaries becomes more closely allied with the ontology of regions." @en
- 'continuant fiat boundary' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: a continuant fiat boundary is a boundary of some material entity (for example: the plane separating the Northern and Southern hemispheres; the North Pole), or it is a boundary of some immaterial entity (for example of some portion of airspace). Three basic kinds of continuant fiat boundary can be distinguished (together with various combination kinds [29" @en
- 'continuant fiat boundary' 'editor note' "Continuant fiat boundary doesn't have a closure axiom because the subclasses don't necessarily exhaust all possibilites. An example would be the mereological sum of two-dimensional continuant fiat boundary and a one dimensional continuant fiat boundary that doesn't overlap it. The situation is analogous to temporal and spatial regions." @en
- 'immaterial entity' 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: Immaterial entities are divided into two subgroups:boundaries and sites, which bound, or are demarcated in relation, to material entities, and which can thus change location, shape and size and as their material hosts move or change shape or size (for example: your nasal passage; the hold of a ship; the boundary of Wales (which moves with the rotation of the Earth) [38, 7, 10" @en
- 'zero-dimensional continuant fiat boundary' 'editor note' "zero dimension continuant fiat boundaries are not spatial points. Considering the example 'the quadripoint where the boundaries of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona meet' : There are many frames in which that point is zooming through many points in space. Whereas, no matter what the frame, the quadripoint is always in the same relation to the boundaries of Colorado, Utah, New Mexico, and Arizona." @en
- 'inheres in' 'editor note' "A dependent inheres in its bearer at all times for which the dependent exists." @en
- 'bearer of' 'editor note' "A bearer can have many dependents, and its dependents can exist for different periods of time, but none of its dependents can exist when the bearer does not exist." @en
- 'has participant' 'editor note' "Has_participant is a primitive instance-level relation between a process, a continuant, and a time at which the continuant participates in some way in the process. The relation obtains, for example, when this particular process of oxygen exchange across this particular alveolar membrane has_participant this particular sample of hemoglobin at this particular time." @en
- 'function of' 'editor note' "A function inheres in its bearer at all times for which the function exists, however the function need not be realized at all the times that the function exists." @en
- 'quality of' 'editor note' "A quality inheres in its bearer at all times for which the quality exists." @en
- 'role of' 'editor note' "A role inheres in its bearer at all times for which the role exists, however the role need not be realized at all the times that the role exists." @en
- 'has function' 'editor note' "A bearer can have many functions, and its functions can exist for different periods of time, but none of its functions can exist when the bearer does not exist. A function need not be realized at all the times that the function exists." @en
- 'has quality' 'editor note' "A bearer can have many qualities, and its qualities can exist for different periods of time, but none of its qualities can exist when the bearer does not exist." @en
- 'has role' 'editor note' "A bearer can have many roles, and its roles can exist for different periods of time, but none of its roles can exist when the bearer does not exist. A role need not be realized at all the times that the role exists." @en
- 'derives from' 'editor note' "This is a very general relation. More specific relations are preferred when applicable, such as 'directly develops from'." @en
- 'derives into' 'editor note' "This is a very general relation. More specific relations are preferred when applicable, such as 'directly develops into'. To avoid making statements about a future that may not come to pass, it is often better to use the backward-looking 'derives from' rather than the forward-looking 'derives into'." @en
- 'location of' 'editor note' "Most location relations will only hold at certain times, but this is difficult to specify in OWL. See https://code.google.com/p/obo-relations/wiki/ROAndTime" @en
- 'located in' 'editor note' "Location as a relation between instances: The primitive instance-level relation c located_in r at t reflects the fact that each continuant is at any given time associated with exactly one spatial region, namely its exact location. Following we can use this relation to define a further instance-level location relation - not between a continuant and the region which it exactly occupies, but rather between one continuant and another. c is located in c1, in this sense, whenever the spatial region occupied by c is part_of the spatial region occupied by c1. Note that this relation comprehends both the relation of exact location between one continuant and another which obtains when r and r1 are identical (for example, when a portion of fluid exactly fills a cavity), as well as those sorts of inexact location relations which obtain, for example, between brain and head or between ovum and uterus" @en
- 'located in' 'editor note' "Most location relations will only hold at certain times, but this is difficult to specify in OWL. See https://code.google.com/p/obo-relations/wiki/ROAndTime" @en
- '2D boundary of' 'editor note' "A 2D boundary may have holes and gaps, but it must be a single connected entity, not an aggregate of several disconnected parts." @en
- '2D boundary of' 'editor note' "Although the boundary is two-dimensional, it exists in three-dimensional space and thus has a 3D shape." @en
- 'has 2D boundary' 'editor note' "A 2D boundary may have holes and gaps, but it must be a single connected entity, not an aggregate of several disconnected parts." @en
- 'has 2D boundary' 'editor note' "Although the boundary is two-dimensional, it exists in three-dimensional space and thus has a 3D shape." @en
- 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: BFO does not claim to provide complete coverage of entities of all types. It seeks only to provide coverage of those entities studied by empirical science together with those entities which affect or are involved in human activities such as data processing and planning - coverage that is sufficiently broad to provide assistance to those engaged in building domain ontologies for purposes of data annotation." @en
- 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: BFO's treatment of continuants and occurrents - as also its treatment of regions, rests on a dichotomy between space and time, and on the view that there are two perspectives on reality - earlier called the 'SNAP' and 'SPAN' perspectives, both of which are essential to the non-reductionist representation of reality as we understand it from the best available science."
- 'editor note' "BFO 2 Reference: For both terms and relational expressions in BFO, we distinguish between primitive and defined. 'Entity' is an example of a primitive term. Primitive terms in a highest-level ontology such as BFO are terms that are so basic to our understanding of reality that there is no way of defining them in a non-circular fashion. For these, therefore, we can provide only elucidations, supplemented by examples and by axioms."
